A POST KEYNESIAN STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT GROWTH MODEL WITH A FULL BANKING SECTOR, A TAYLOR RULE AND A NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
Building a stock-flow consistent model requires three steps: writing the matrices, counting the variables and the accounting identities issued from the matrices, and defining each unknown with an equation (accounting identity or behavioural equation).
Matrices
Five sectors form our economy: government, firms, households, private banks and central bank. All production must be financed. However, current production is financed by the working capital of entrepreneurs (retained earnings) and by contracted revolving funds granted by banks at the current rate of interest. These two factors constitute a shock absorber to possible monetary rationing by banks. We are essentially limiting our study to the effects that monetary policy might have on new financing for investment and growth of production.
Let us proceed to examine the gross supply (ϕ) and the net supply (ΔF) of finance by banksthat is to say, the new flow of money, as opposed to the existing stock of money (D) . Also, there is a stock of money demand equal to transaction, precaution, finance and speculative motives, whereas the desired gross finance demand (ϕ d ) represents the new flow of financing required by firms (I d ) plus the redemption of the debt (amortization = amort) minus the undistributed profits (P u ). Thus the internal funds of firms (IF) represent the undistributed profits (P u ) minus the redemption of the debt (amort). Assuming a closed economy, demand for money can be satisfied by banks, either by the stock markets or by credit. At the end of the period, net financing demand (ΔF D ) can be constrained by net money supply from banks (ΔF) (granted financing -paid off financingamortization). ΔF determines monetary creation in the period.
We discuss here a closed economy. Firms issue equities, bonds with fixed rates of interest and commercial papers, and borrow money from banks to finance investments but they neither hold money balance. They have excess capacity but no inventories.
1 Two factors are involved in producing goods (fixed capital and labour), but we deal with a vertically integrated sector and hence ignore all intermediate goods. Banks have no operating costs and they don't make loans to households. Contrary to , private banks own a net wealth and retain all their profits. The central bank has neither operating costs nor net worth. The central bank pays all its profits to the government, which collects taxes from households and finances its deficit by issuing Treasury bills. Government expenditures are only final sales of consumption goods: there is neither operating costs (like wages for state employees) nor transfers between households. The financial behaviour of households is simplified: they hold only banking deposit account (current accounts and time deposits). SFC modelling is based on two tables: a balance sheet matrix (stocks) and a transactions matrix (flows). Table 8 .1 gives the transactions matrix that describes monetary flows between the five sectors of the economy. Every row represents a monetary transaction, and every column corresponds to a sector, which is fragmented in a current and a capital account, except in basic cases such as the government and that of households. Sources of funds appear with plus signs and uses of funds with negative signs, so every row must sum to zero seeing that each transaction corresponds always simultaneously to a source and a use of funds. The sum of each column must also be zero since each account (or sub-account) is balanced. Table 8 .2 gives the balance sheet matrix of our economy. Symbols with plus describe assets and negative signs indicate liabilities. The sum of every row is again zero except in the case of accumulated capital in the industrial sector. The last row presents the net wealth of each sector. Second, we must use the accounting identities resulting from each row and each column sum to zero. We have nine accounting identities corresponding to the eight columns of the transactions matrix and to the non-ordinary row 2 . To start we transcribe the identities (uses of funds on the left side, sources of funds on the right side) without being precise how we will use them in the model: 
A feature of SFC models is that if there are M columns and N non ordinary rows in the transactions matrix, then there are only (M + N -1) independent accounting identities in the model. Because of this one equation must be dropped: we shall use exactly eight accounting identities in the model. Concerning the balance sheet matrix, it is simpler: we just make sure that initial values of stocks are consistent with the matrix. In the following periods, stocks will stay consistent since our eight identities will generate consistent flows. Now we must define every variable relative to the five sectors using an accounting identity 3 or a behavioural equation. When we introduce new unknowns in a behavioural equation we define them immediately so that our model should have the same number of equations as unknowns.
The national income (Y) adds the household consumption (C), investment of the firms (I) and the public expenditure (G). The rate of growth of the national income is gr y :
Two fiscal policies for the Government: G, T, B, i b The government collects only taxes from households (on wages):
The government finances any deficit issuing bills, so that the supply of treasury bills (B) in the economy is identical to the stock of government debt. In other words, it is given by the preexisting stock of debt plus its current deficit (GD). The current deficit of the Government includes the redemption of the National debt. We assume that private banks give limitless credit to government at the long-term rate of interest: (8.4) B = B -1 + GD (8.5) i b = i l To analyze the consequences of a supply shock, we assume two different assumptions for the fiscal policy. We contrast a rule on public expenditures (F1) with a rule on public deficits (F2).
Assumption 1 (F1): A stabilizing effect of the fiscal policy First, we assume that public expenditure (G) is always growing at the same rate (gr y ) as the national income (Y). With F1, public expenditure is pro-cyclical, because G falls with the GDP. But the final effect of the fiscal policy is measured by the government deficit (GD). Tax revenue is proportional to income and hence varies in line with the public expenditure. But with a contractionary monetary policy and its higher interest rate, the financial costs of the national debt increase. The global impact is linked to the key interest rate and, then, to the monetary policy. It looks like a co-ordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies. With F1, the economy has a self-stabilizing tendency due to the fiscal policy, though the fiscal policy effect comes through the effects of interest rate on the budget deficit.
(
Assumption 2 (F2): a 'neutral' fiscal policy Second, we assume that a 'neutral' fiscal policy corresponds to a constant ratio (r GD ) of government deficit-to-the last national income: DB/Y -1 . It is more or less the case of the Maastricht treaty of the European Union. The stability and growth pact of the Treaty decrees that 'Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits'. Then we use the first accounting identity to calculate the adequate public expenditure. In experiences, we shall take the ratio (r GD ) equal to zero as is required by the Maastricht treaty. Contrary to the previous assumption, the public debt is zero, since the budget is balanced. As the interest rate does not act on fiscal policy, there is no coordination between the fiscal and the monetary policies.
(8.6-F2) GD = r GD · Y -1 With r GD : constant
With these assumptions, we should better understand the links between monetary policy and fiscal policy (Figure 8.1 , e, OG The investment function is the most important one in a growth model. The stock of capital increases with the flow of net investment (I) that is financed by the total of external funds from commercial banks (gross finance = ϕ) and by the internal funds of firms. The self-financing of firms corresponds to the retained earnings (P u ) minus the redemption of the debts of firms (amort).
Amortization concerns only the debt: loans (L), bonds (OF) and commercial papers (CP).
In our model, we focus on the difference between actual investment (I) and the desired investment of firms (I D ). The banks accept to finance totally or in part the second one according their lender's risk (LR) (see equations 8.32, 8.33, 8.35 
Distributed dividends (P d ) are a fraction of profits realized in the previous period:
With s f : constant Retained earnings (P u ) are determined as the residual:
Equations concerning issues of equities by firms are usually oversimplified in SFC models. We simply assume that the stock of shares grows at the rate of the GDP with a lag of one year (gr y-1 ): Δ e / e -1 = gr y-1 . The more the economy grows, the more firms issue equities. There are two explanations. First it is easier to sell new equities when the economy and thus the profits grow. Second, firms need new finance to follow the growth of the GDP. Following the Kaleckian tradition, we assume that wages are mostly consumed while financial income is largely devoted to saving (1>α 1 >α 2 >0). This class-based saving behaviour is of importance in a SFC model where interest payments play a great role. With the same high propensity to consume (α 1 =α 2 ) , an increase of the interest rates can move the economy to a higher growth path in the long run. The consumption decision determines the amount that households will save out of their disposable income Y h :
Private banks: i l , L, i cp , CP, i of , p of , of, i d , p e , P b Firms' financing is fundamental in a monetary economy of production. Firms begin by being self-financed then turn to external finance (ΔF D ). Banks only finance projects they consider profitable, but confidence in their judgment is variable and can justify various strategies. Banks examine firms' productive and financial expectations and also their financial structure. This investigation is made according to their confidence in the state of long-term expectations of yields on capital assets, influencing what Keynes referred to as 'animal spirits'. After the study of expected production and of demand of financing that integrates the firm's borrowing risk (r b ), bankers can refuse to finance. The state of confidence of banks summarizes these factors.
Banks know a lender's risk (LR) when underwriting finance 6 and creating money. Lender's risk is the sum of three fundamental risks:
• First, risk of default corresponds to the bank's perception regarding the borrower's likelihood failure to repay the claim.
• Second, risk of liquidity. Liquidity entails the ability to reverse a decision at any moment at the smallest possible cost.
• Third, market risk corresponds to unanticipated changes on the various financial markets. Market risk can be split into other risks. Fluctuations in capital asset prices modify their value and explain capital risk -which is very high for equities and fixed-yield bonds. For the fixed-yield bonds, capital risk is inversely proportional to interest rates. The risk of income mainly concerns the highly uncertain dividends of equities and the variable yield of loans. Finaly, monetary policy involves a money market risk when fluctuations in the money interest rates occur. In equations (8.32, 8.35, 8.52, 8.53) , the risks of default and of liquidity are take account by the gap of the leverage ratio with a conventional leverage ratio. We also introduce the Tobin's q ratio and the cost of indebtedness for the risk of default. The market risk is taken into account by the expected capital gains on equities (CG e a ) and on fixed-yield bonds (CG of a ), but also with the central bank interest rate. When the lender's risk is at a maximum (LR = 1), commercial banks refuse to finance the net investment of firms: ΔF = 0. Desired investment (I D ) faces a serious finance rationing. The flow of net investment is only financed by self-funding, that is the retained earnings (P u ), minus the amortization of the debt, minus the capital losses of firms (CG). Thus the money supply (in stock) can be reduced with the redemption of the debt. If the lender's risk is null (LR = 0), desired investment is fully financed:
It is the horizontalist case. The capital losses of firms are also the capital gains of banks, measured by the capital losses on equities (CG e ) and on fixed rate bonds (CG of ) (équations 44 and 50).
In the model, the lender's risk (LR) is measured by the difference between the current leverage ratio and the conventional leverage ratio (quantity of indebtedness), by the Tobin's q ratio and by the cost of indebtedness (i cb ). The higher current indebtedness of firms ((CP + OF + L)/K) is over the accepted indebtedness, the more the lender's risk is. The accepted indebtedness is conventional, but this conventional indebtedness can increase during a boom and decrease during a crisis. Tobin's q ratio is measured by the financial value of the firms on the capital (K). The financial value is the value of the equities on the market. We come to the equations defining the portfolio behaviour of banks. We follow the methodology developed by Godley and Lavoie (2007) and inspired by Tobin (1958) . Banks can hold four different assets: bonds (with fixed rate of interest) OF = of . p of , equities E = e . p e , loans at variable long-term interest rate (L) and commercial paper (CP) at short-term interest rate. The λ ij parameters follow the vertical, horizontal and symmetry constraints (Godley and Lavoie, 2007) . Banks are assumed to make a certain proportion λ i0 of their financing in the form of asset i but this proportion is modified by the rates of return on these assets. Banks are concerned about (i l ) and (i cp ), the rates of interest on loans and on commercial paper to be determined at the end of the current period, but which will generate the interest payments in the following period. We have further assumed that it is the expected rates of return on equities (r e a ) and on bonds (r of a ) that enter into the determination of portfolio choice. The four assets demand function described with the matrix algebra are thus:
As it is the case with every matrix, we cannot keep all these equations in the model because each one of them is a logical implication of the others. We model commercial paper as the residual equation:
(8.41) CP = F -OF -E -L For the bonds, the expected rate of yield (r of a ) is the fixed interest rate plus the expected capital gains on the market value of the previous period of these bonds (OF -1 ). The market value of the bonds is the number of bonds (of) times their prices (p of ). The interest rate (i of ) is always the long-term interest rate of the first period applied to the initial price (in t 0 , p of = 1). But after the first period, the prices of the old and of the new fixed-yield bonds (p of ) is inversely proportional to the changes in the long-term interest rates (i l (8.51) p e = E / e Monetary authorities determine exogenously the key rate on the money market (i cb ). In 1936, Keynes asserts that this rate is widely conventional. While central banks fix the short-term rates, private banks' liquidity preference determines banking rates (short, medium and long-term interest rates). Significant rates for growth and financing (loan) are the long-term interest rates (i l ). The link between short-term and long-term interest rates is complex. Macroeconomic banking interest rates (i l ) are the production costs of money plus a risk premium. The first element corresponds to functioning costs (wages, investment, immobilization); payment costs for monetary liabilities (subjected to the firms competition for households savings) and the cost of high powered money determined by the central bank; and to a rate of margin (χ) corresponding to standard profits of banks. The production costs of money are equal to (i cb ) plus a relatively constant mark up (χ).
Risk premiums are not constant because they are the fruits of the banks' liquidity preference. Risk premiums cover lender's risk (lr). Five expectations strongly influence risk premiums: anticipations about the productivity, economic evolution (growth, employment) and budget; expected inflation; the level of future short-term rates of interest; financial markets' evolution and capital assets' prices; foreign long-term rates present. In the model, we use the same lender's risk as the one seen previously (equation 8.35) , that is a mix of leverage ratio and Tobin's q ratio. But with the different coefficients (a 2 ) and (b 2 ), (lr) can be negative and reduces the mark up. Therefore the long-term interest rate becomes endogenous and the spread between (i cb ) and (i l ) is not constant. Contrary to the horizontalist' view, we introduce an endogenous curve of the interest rates. To explain the short-term interest rates (i b or i cp ), i cb and χ are sufficient. On the contrary, lr is the primary variable in order to explain long-term interest rates (i l , i of ,). Banks apply a spread (χ 3 ) between the key rate and the rate on deposits in order to realize profits. The initial structure of interest rates is as following: i l > i of > i cp > i b = i cb > i d Banks try to maximize their net income. To make a profit, they finance the economy and agree to become less liquid. By making the almost irreversible decisions of financing, they are subjected to the lender's risk. They can hope for big profits only by lowering their LP B . Economic activity also depends on the animal spirits of banks. Finance scarcity can only be the consequence of a deliberate choice. 'Desired scarcity' of financing is the sign of banks' liquidity preference. From an optimal structure of their balance sheet, we can measure the profits of commercial banks (P b ) obtained by monetary financing:
It is assumed that banks are obliged by the government to hold reserve requirements (H) in high powered money that do not generate interest payments and that must always be a fixed share (the compulsory ratio η) of deposits: (8.57) H = η · D
Since the central bank is collecting interest payments advances while paying out no interest on the notes, it is also making profits P cb :
It is assumed, in line with current practice, that any profits realized by the central bank revert to the government. Following the theory of endogenous money, we assume that the central bank is fully accommodating. First the central bank fixes the key rate of interest (i cb ) using a Taylor rule and second it provides whatever advances (REF) demanded by banks at this rate.
Taylor propounded his first rule in 1993, modelling the dual mandate of the Fed. It was founded on the output gap and on the inflation gap. But the output gap generates a theoretical problem to the RBC models (Goodfriend-King or Rotenberg-Woodford) and creates an implementation problem for inflation targeting. Inflation targeting is more a hierarchical mandate than a dual mandate. A truncated rule (without the output gap) appeared as a theoretical answer (Batini and Haldane, 1999) , but this solution does not characterize well the practice of central banking. The development of the DGSE models and of the New Macroeconomic Consensus (NCM) around three equations (IS, TR and NKPC) explains the numerous papers on the status of the output gap.
In our model, we use two of three equations from the NCM: a Taylor rule and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve. But we replace the IS equation by our post keynesian SFC model. We take two sorts of Taylor rule: a standard one and a truncated one.
The first hypothesis (M1) is that central bank uses a standard Taylor rule, modelling the dual mandate of the Fed. The key interest rate (i cb ) is a negative function of the output gap and a positive function of the inflation gap. Output gap is the difference between the full capacity output (Y fc ) and the current output (Y). Output gap in ratio (see equation 8.19 for OG R ) is output over the output gap. Inflation gap is the difference between current inflation and the target of inflation (Π*). As in standard Taylor rule, we add a neutral interest rate, exogenously fixed at 2 %. The inflation target is 1 %. At the steady state, the key interest rate is equal to 3 %, so the real key interest rate is equal to the neutral interest rate (i cb -Π* = i* = 2%). In this case, the three gaps (output, inflation and interest rate) are equal to zero. The monetary rule M1 is:
(8.59-M1) i cb = i* + Π + α 4 .OG R + α 6 (Π -Π*)
The second hypothesis (M2) is a truncated Taylor rule similar to the unique mandate of ECB. A truncated Taylor rule only contains the inflation gap. When the central bank has a unique mandate, the fear of inflation is higher. We should have: α 5 > α 6 . We put α 6 = 0,5 and α 5 > 1. The monetary rule (M2) is:
A kind of New Keynesian Phillips Curve models inflation (Taylor, 1979) . When inflation is low and close to its target, we consider that the anticipations of inflation are anchored on the target. In this case, inflation does not react to the variations of output gap (OG R ). Inflation depends only on the anticipated inflation (Π a ) that is anchored on the target: Π a = Π*. This leads to a horizontal NKPC. But if the variations in output are too important (for instance, close to full capacity output) or, if an exogenous supply shock occurs (for instance, a shock in the productivity or in the oil price), inflation reacts. Inflation reappears over OG Rmini and disinflation under OG Rmaxi . The idea that for small disturbances the inflation rate is stable while for large disturbances it is unstable was coined by Leijonhufvud (1981:112n) in the notion of a 'corridor'. The economy has stability inside the corridor, while it will lose stability outside. Such a 'corridor of stability' can provide another way of looking at Keynes's insight that the economy is not violently unstable.The shape of the curve is as follows: We can model the loss function of the society as a linear-quadratic function. It supposes that the society has a symmetric target. It is an ad hoc loss function because it does not have any microfoundations. It is not a utility-based loss function based on the utility function of the representative agent (Woodford, 2003) . It is connected with the final objective of the society. The society seeks to reach three objectives: price stability, full employment and financial-market stability. The price of equities is not part of governments' or central banks' policies. Society as a whole does not share the same concerns that the government or the central bank. Their reaction functions are not derived from the loss function. Asset prices in the steady state correspond to (p e *). We measure the volatility of the asset prices by (p e -p e *). We can represent the welfare performance of such policies by their welfare cost. In our model, we have: β 1 = β 2 = β 3 = 1,33 (8.62) LF = β 1 (Π -Π*) 2 + β 2 OG R 2 + β 3 (p e -p e *) 2 Our model is now closed. We have defined the 26 variables of the transactions matrix introducing 37 new variables 7 and we now have the same number of equations (62) 
EXPERIMENTS ABOUT A SUPPLY SHOCK WITH TWO POLICY MIX
We make simulations 8 by imposing exogenous supply shocks corresponding to an inflationary shock of 1% during three years (5, 6 and 7); e.g. an increase in oil price. This cost-push increase in inflation is first reflected in the NKPC and then, the key interest rate given by the Taylor rule. The key interest rate of the central bank is endogenous. In turn, changes in the short term rate of interest modify the long term interest rate and the growth rate through the different channels of transmission developed by the model. Then fiscal policy acts upon the economy. The consequences of the supply shock are examined for two kinds of policy mix 9 :
• For country (1), monetary policy is determined by a standard Taylor rule (M1) that corresponds to a dual mandate: output gap and inflation gap. The fiscal policy rule (F1) has a stabilizing effect (see Figure 8 .1). But this effect is insufficient to restore the economy to the previous steady state. There is a co-ordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies. Country (1) could describe as a policy followed by the United States.
• For country (2), monetary policy is determined by a 'truncated' Taylor rule (M2) that corresponds to a unique mandate: inflation gap only. Fiscal policy (F2) is neutralized, because we assume the fiscal rule that the ratio of the current deficit of the Government (GD) on the GDP is constant and equal to zero, as imposed by the Maastricht treaty. Country (2) could describe an idealized European policy. In our economy, the steady state is not the full-employment equilibrium. The output gap is positive, with a significant rate of unemployment. Potential output corresponds to the full capacity output. Figure 8 .3 shows that country (1) resists much better than country (2) to a supply shock. The fall in the growth rate and in the desired growth rate of accumulation of capital is much lower. In addition, the emergence of economic cycles is obvious in the country (2). Without output gap in the Taylor rule and with the removal of the fiscal tool, the economic situation deteriorates and becomes more strongly cyclical. The rate of utilization of productive capacity falls more in the second country than in the first (Figure 8.4) . The financial behaviour of firms explains widely these developments. The borrower's risk measured by the rate of cash flow (r cf ) and the financial condition index (FCI) rises substantially. With higher costs of financing, the rate of cash flows (r cf = P u /K -1 ) drops in the short term. Interest payments on loans and commercial papers increase, and this reduces retained profits. But then, firms reduce the issue of equities to preserve the part of undistributed profits (P u ) and the rate of cash flow rises but under its first position. The drop in the Tobin's ratio is an additional negative effect (Figure 8 .5). The financial condition index increases vigorously with the fall in the financial capitalization (E/Y). With the depressed FCI and the lower cash flow ratio, the borrower's risk increases seriously. To simplify, we introduced inflation only in the NKPC and we do not take into account the difference between real and monetary variables in the rest of the model. Inflation could be integrated into the determinants of lender's risk and borrower's risk and into the portfolio matrix, in order to better integrate the wealth effects. Monetary policy tries to neutralize expectations of inflation, but it had little impact on the shock of inflation, which is exogenous.
Since the fear of inflation is higher in country (2), central bank rate of interest reacts more vigorously (Figure 8.6 ). This rise enlarges the output gap more in country (2) than in country (1). Business cycles appear (Figure 8.7) . With a lower inflation rate and a higher interest rate, the real interest rate of country (2) far exceeds that of country (1), which restricts more investment and growth. effects on the output gap
The influence of output gap on the key interest rate is lower than that of inflation, even with the standard Taylor rule. With the sharp rise in interest rates, investment, which reacts swiftly to the interest rate, will be more affected than other components of demand. On the one hand, the fall in investment will be larger than the expansion resulting from stabilizing policy of the country (1). On the other hand, the fiscal policy F2, which has no stabilizing effect, explains the strong negative effect on the growth of the country (2). Finally, the rise in interest rates improves the financial income of households and so consumption. But, with our Kaleckian consumption function, the benefits on consumption are very weak. This effect is insufficient to offset the others.
One key element of the experiments is the increase of the lender's risk. The fall of the Tobin's q ratio plus the lowest solvency of firms following the rise of the interest rates explain the rise of the lender's risk and the decreasing leverage ratio (Figure 8 .5). Our virtual economies experience a transitory business depression, characterized by a lower rate of utilization capacity, a lower Tobin's ratio and leverage, and higher lender's and borrower's risks. The consequence is a credit rationing of the investment of firms by private banks (Figure 8.8) . The credit rationing of firms explains an increasing rate of unemployment. The situation is worse in the second country. Let us examine the bank-balance-sheet channel. Four channels ar5 usually taken into account by literature: wealth effect (Davis et Palumbo, 2001 ), Tobin's q (Tobin, 1969) , the financial accelerator (Bernanke and al., 1999) and the capital of banks (Van den Heuvel, 2002) . We have these four channels in the model (Le Heron, 2007a With the country 2, we see a sharp volatility in the financial markets (stocks and bonds) and a significant fall in the profit of banks (Figures 8.5 and 8.9 ). These elements could explain the coming out of financial crises. We can argue from these experiments that it is preferable to include the output gap in Taylor rule and that the use of stabilizing fiscal policy is beneficial. Indeed, simulations showed a high volatility in production with the truncated rule, but also price volatility on the financial markets. Financial instability may be an unforeseen consequence. Since money is not neutral, it is difficult to consider inflation only for the monetary policy. We note that the absence of output gap accentuates the decline in the growth and increases the volatility of the economy. In case of supply shock, coordination with a stabilizing fiscal policy always generates better results and does not cause any business cycles. Co-ordination between policies, as we see in United States, is more efficient than the total separation between fiscal and monetary policies, which is required by the Maastricht treaty.
We have modelled two kinds of institutions. We can use a welfare function of the society seeking to maximize the following three objectives with the same weight for each of them: price stability, growth and stability in financial markets. Clearly, the institutional design of the United States is far better than in European Union (Figure 8.10) .
In this chapter, we have tried to make the New Keynesian consensus in macroeconomics compatible with the Post Keynesian theories in a stock-flow consistent approach. By taking into account the behaviour of private banks, a more realistic creation of money, the stocks and the financial risks of firms and banks, we can analyze more deeply the problems of co-ordination between fiscal policy and monetary policy. Indeed, the intensity of these problems has increased with the full independence given to some central banks. This stock-flow consistent model is a first step into this research agenda. 
